Chapter 11. Legitimacy and Democracy in RIOs: Closing or Widening the Gap? by Ribeiro Hoffman, A. & Vleuten, J.M. van der
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a preprint version which may differ from the publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/160038
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2018-07-08 and may be subject to
change.
chapter 11
legitimacy and democracy in regional 
integration organizations: 
closing or widening the gap?
andrea ribeiro hoffmann and anna van der vleuten
The Puzzle
as stated in chapter 1, our major aim in this book was to explore the connections 
between rios, legitimacy and democracy. in particular, we asked whether the 
creation and development of rios has contributed to widening or closing the gap 
which exists between citizens and policy makers as a result of the processes of 
regionalization and globalization. 
we have argued that the regional level and rios have peculiarities which 
make them an interesting object of study within the debate about legitimacy and 
democracy beyond the nation state. Unlike global and functional international 
organizations, rios are based around a certain territory, and a certain identity which 
gives meaning to this territory. this construction of a region consisting of territory 
and ideas encourages people living in the region to identify with the rio and its 
policies. furthermore, rios are not single-issue organizations but have a broad 
mission, which implies that regional governance can cut across all policy domains 
previously controlled by national decision makers.
we found that literature on legitimacy and democracy in rios has hitherto 
focused mostly on economic performance, or exclusively on one particular rio: the 
european Union, which, in turn, is conceptualized not as a ‘normal’ rio, but as a sui 
generis actor. this raised the question of whether it is possible to speak about rios 
in the same way that we speak about states: can we treat them as a homogeneous 
group in spite of the differences between them? and what does this mean for the 
validity and generalizability of our conclusions? in this regard, we acknowledge 
the differences between the eU and other rios, but we take the view that they are, 
nevertheless, all rios; the difference between them is not ontological, but rather of 
degree – the degree of scope and depth of cooperation and integration, the degree 
of institutionalization, the degree of supranationality, and state of development. 
Even excluding the EU, RIOs vary significantly: ASEAN, the SADC, Caricom 
and Mercosur do not all share the same objectives or the same type and level of 
institutionalization and they are in different stages of development. the point here 
is that the defining aspect of RIOs is not their degree of supranationality, but rather 
their territorially limited area, their claim to a common identity, and the broad scope 
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of their mission and activities. the degree of institutionalization and the range of 
aims and policies of a specific RIO do not change our basic assumption that ‘all 
social systems have to have some mechanism that gives them legitimacy’ (chapter 
1). They only differ as regards the specific mechanisms available for realizing input, 
control and output legitimacy.  although we do not categorize each rio we deal 
with in terms of the aspects mentioned above, from the cases studied in the chapters 
of this book, we can argue that institutional differences become relevant when 
investigating legitimacy and democracy insofar as they influence the possibility of 
representation and participation, and the effectiveness of policymaking. differences 
in policy output will influence the relevance of the legitimacy question: if an RIO is 
unable to make any decisions, it will surely suffer from a lack of output legitimacy, 
and this will eclipse its probable lack of input and control legitimacy.
with all these considerations in mind, let us return to the questions we asked in 
chapter 1: 
given the ‘state-oriented’ concepts of legitimacy and democracy, what do the 
concepts of legitimacy and democracy mean in non-national political systems 
such as regional integration organizations? 
to what extent do rios display input legitimacy, control legitimacy and 
output legitimacy? 
to what extent do regional parliaments and subnational state actors contribute 
to closing the legitimacy/democracy gap?
to what extent do non-state actors (civil society) contribute to closing the 
legitimacy/democracy gap? 
do rios display output legitimacy in the sense that they strengthen democracy 
in their member states? 
The reasoning behind these questions was, first of all, that we must know what 
we are talking about when we refer to democracy and legitimacy in a regional 
political system, and that we must have an idea about how to measure these concepts 
for empirical purposes within a comparative framework. to address this question, 
we looked firstly at the channels of representation and participation created by RIO 
member states themselves, such as regional parliamentary bodies and sub-national 
state actors. secondly, we examined the channels of representation and participation 
for non-state actors created by civil society, including business and sectoral interest 
groups, and incorporated to a greater or lesser extent into each rio. in table 11.1 
we give an overview of the relevant questions, and the chapters of this volume which 
have addressed them. 
The Outcomes
Based on the studies developed by the contributors to this volume, what can we say 
about the questions we raised? 
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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Table 11.1 Overview of questions and chapters
Question Chapter/ focus RIO investigated
1. How can we define 
legitimacy and democracy 
in non-national political 
systems?
Ch.2  – concepts of RIOs, 
legitimacy, democracy
Ch.3 – concept of regional 
democracy
2. to what extent do rios 
display input, control 
and output legitimacy 
mechanisms?
Ch.4 – selection of 
indicators and mechanisms 
of input, control and output 
legitimacy
31 rios: 8 from 
africa, 4 from asia & 
Pacific, 5 from Middle 
east & western asia, 
from 9 from western 
hemisphere and 5 from 
central and eastern 
europe & former second 
world
3. what is the role of 
regional parliaments and 
subnational state actors 
in contributing to rios 
democracy/legitimacy?
Ch.5 – regional parliaments, 
comparison and explanation 
of differences with regard to 
democracy/legitimacy
european parliament 
(eU), parlatino, parlacen 
(sica), parlandino 
(can), Mercosur 
parliament
Ch.6 – sub-national actors, 
contribution to democracy 
and input legitimacy
eU and Mercosur
4. what is the role of non-
state actors in contributing to 
rios democracy/legitimacy?
Ch.7 – non-state actors, 
input and control legitimacy
Mercosur
Ch.8 – non-state actors, 
input and control legitimacy
caricom
5. do rios play a role in 
strengthening democracy in 
member states?
Ch.3 – relationship between 
regional and domestic 
democracy
eU, caricoM, sica, 
Mercosur, can, sadc, 
asean 
Ch.9 – interventions, output 
legitimacy
sadc, asean
Ch.10 – political 
conditionality, output 
legitimacy
eU, Mercosur
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The first question: concepts
Regarding the first question, Berry Tholen and Juliana Erthal contributed to the 
elucidation of the concepts of legitimacy and democracy, and more particularly their 
role at the regional level. In Chapter 2, Tholen elaborated a definition of regional 
legitimacy drawing strongly from fritz scharpf, but focusing more strictly on the 
functional aspects of legitimacy in order to distance himself from the national level, 
and therefore adding a third type of legitimacy, namely control legitimacy, alongside 
input and output legitimacy. 
Input legitimacy is defined as the de facto representation and participation of civil 
society in the decision making processes of rios in order to develop well-informed 
policies. what is important here is that the mere existence of formal channels of 
participation is not enough. parliamentary bodies, for instance, contribute to input 
legitimacy only if they are open to all societal voices and debates are public. in 
corporatist and pluralist structures, the focus is on non-governmental organizations 
and the opportunities they have to participate in decision making. again, these actors 
can only contribute to input legitimacy if they are able to bring many different voices 
into the public debate, which depends on their practical capability to organize, the 
freedom of organization and speech, and the existence and openness of institutional 
arrangements at rio level to deliberate publicly. 
with regard to control legitimacy, arrangements typically concern checks on 
executive powers, and involve judicial review and parliamentary or corporatist 
control. regarding parliamentary arrangements, the criteria for evaluation are the 
powers and competencies of parliamentary bodies, and their capacity to turn to a 
court. for non-parliamentary mechanisms, the criteria concern the accreditation of 
non-state actors, and not only formal, but also their effective capacity to influence 
policy-making. 
finally, the criteria for evaluation of output legitimacy of a rio refer to its role 
in upgrading the common interest. the common interest can involve economic 
issues such as growth and the distribution of wealth, but as tholen points out, it 
may also involve the strengthening of democracy itself as the main objective. rios 
will therefore enjoy output legitimacy, not only if they produce economic benefits 
but also if they effectively contribute to the promotion of civic participation within 
the political systems of the member states, if their actions lead to guarantees of 
individual rights within their region, if the citizens of member states are empowered 
to stand up for their rights and interests by means of participatory arrangements and 
a legal system, and if there are mechanisms to sanction member states in the case of 
a threat of or an effective breach of democratic rules.
Having thus defined regional-level legitimacy, chapter 3 proceeds with a further 
elaboration of the concept of regional democracy based mainly on robert dahl’s 
definition of (national) democracy and polyarchy, and guillermo o’donnell’s 
definition of (national) delegative democracy. Dahl’s definition is, as Erthal calls 
it, a ‘minimal concept of regional democracy’. it focuses on the political dimension 
of democracy, and on the representation (not direct participation) of citizens in the 
exercise of political power. erthal also highlights the importance of the possibility 
of public contestation for regional democracy. this concept is based on the goals 
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of populist democracy, popular sovereignty and political equality, and the rule of 
majority, advanced by dahl. in addition, it takes into consideration the maturity 
and consolidation of democratic institutions, as advanced by o’donnell. the main 
argument is that a rio should not be judged against ideal models of (regional) 
democracies, but against real regional democracies, as implied in Dahl’s definition 
of polyarchy. RIOs, just like national political systems, cannot simply be classified as 
democratic or not, but rather, must have their level of democracy carefully assessed. 
additionally, any assessment of the quality of democracy within a rio should 
include its level of institutionalization and consolidation. erthal’s argument leads 
to the conclusion that, firstly, given the young age of RIOs in comparison to nation-
states, one should not expect rio institutions to be as democratic as nations-states, 
and secondly that rios can potentially be democratized: they are not ‘condemned’ 
to be democratically deficient.
The second question: indicators
The second question – to what extent RIOs display input, control and output 
legitimacy mechanisms? – was addressed by Bob Reinalda in Chapter 4. He agrees 
with ruth grant and robert Keohane, as opposed to the view of robert dahl and 
much regionalization literature, that the legitimacy of a RIO is not confined to the 
output dimension, and that the input and control legitimacy of a rio can also be 
assessed. reinalda has elaborated a broad set of indicators of rio legitimacy for use 
in empirical studies. this contribution can be seen, therefore, as a bridge between 
the conceptual discussion in the preceding chapters and the qualitative analysis of 
the effective legitimacy of rios in the later chapters. 
reinalda has made an extensive inventory of rios, indicating the presence or 
absence of each of the mechanisms which could allow input, control and output 
legitimacy. he shows that it is possible to assess the legitimacy of rios along 
comparative lines. his data indicates that, among the 31 rios analysed, 15 have 
mechanisms which have the potential to contribute to input legitimacy (13 scoring 
‘weak’; 2 scoring ‘present’; 0 scoring ‘strong’), 12 have the potential to contribute 
to control legitimacy (5; 4; 3) and 23 to output legitimacy (8; 10; 5). this chapter 
thus is a basis for an evaluation of the effective legitimacy of rios as compared to 
their potential legitimacy. Qualitative studies can use this inventory of rios and 
their mechanisms as a springboard for further research in order to check the extent 
to which these mechanisms are used in reality, and whether they actually work. this 
is done in the studies presented in the following parts of the volume, guided by 
questions three, four and five. 
The third question: regional parliaments and subnational state actors
the third question, concerning the role of regional parliaments and subnational state 
actors, is explored in chapters 5 and 6. as emphasized earlier, parliamentary bodies 
are viewed as potential contributors to input and control legitimacy. their existence 
and formal powers are basic requirements, but their transparency and openness to 
civil society are important variables as well. andrés Malamud and luís de sousa 
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investigate the characteristics of such bodies in the eU and a selected group of 
latin american rios: the european parliament (eU), parlatino, parlacen (sica), 
parlandino (can) and Mercosur parliament (Mercosur). they evaluate the extent 
to which these five parliaments have actually met the conditions for contributing to 
input and control legitimacy. 
regarding input legitimacy, they conclude that the record is poor since only 
in the european parliament are parliamentarians directly elected. the Mercosur 
parliament is supposed to have direct elections only in 2011. none of the latin 
american parliaments are accountable to citizens, nor do they have legislative 
power. regarding control legitimacy, parlacen is the only latin american institution 
capable of monitoring other regional bodies. the authors also offer an explanation 
for the significant qualitative difference found between the EP and the four Latin 
American parliaments, which is based on five variables: time (institutional maturity), 
sequence (the EP being the only to follow the ‘Monnet method’ – function preceding 
form, and incrementalism), the level of economic integration (from free trade area to 
common market), the strength and stability of domestic institutions and, finally, the 
type of domestic regime (parliamentary of presidential). Based on these variables, 
a profile was made of the ‘legitimacy potential’ of regional parliaments in the other 
regions also studied in the chapter.  
in chapter 6, Marcelo Medeiros explores the participation of sub-national state 
actors in the process of decision-making in Mercosur, also referring to the european 
Union. he attributes much importance to sub-national state actors, arguing that they 
can play an important role in the legitimacy of rios. Medeiros shows how these 
actors have strengthened their participation both at the national level of Mercosur’s 
main member states (argentina and Brazil) and directly at the regional level. the 
participation of subnational actors has the potential to enhance the legitimacy of 
Mercosur, the same way that decentralization in argentina and Brazil has contributed 
to democratization and an increase in efficiency, with a positive impact upon input, 
control and output legitimacy of domestic regimes (as long as the increase in power 
of subnational actors is accompanied by mechanisms of control). Medeiros suggests 
that if subnational state actors manage to increase their influence at the regional 
level, this may also have a positive impact upon Mercosur legitimacy.
The fourth question: non-state actors
the fourth question, about the involvement of non-state actors, is addressed in 
chapters 7 and 8. a main concern of this book is the question of to what extent 
the participation of non-state actors in rios can contribute to a closing of the gap 
between citizens and policy-makers as a result of the processes of globalization 
and regionalization. Using different sources (primary documents and interviews), 
Michelle ratton sanchez and gerda van roozendaal were able to establish whether 
non-state actors have had a de facto impact on the input and control legitimacy 
of RIOs. They worked with broad definitions of non-state actors in Mercosur and 
caricom, respectively. 
ratton sanchez concludes that Mercosur’s regulations concerning the 
participation of non-state actors offer the opportunity for input and control legitimacy 
Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann and Anna van der Vleuten 199
mechanisms. however, this rio fails to implement the objectives stated as a result 
of the confusing and restrictive terminology it uses to identify eligible actors, and 
the lack of regulation concerning procedures for participation and mechanisms for 
inclusion. Moreover, Mercosur bodies have the power to define when, where, how 
and who will be consulted, which causes a bias in the contribution of civil society. 
the lack of transparency is another major factor undermining Mercosur’s capacity 
to foster a de facto participation of non-state actors, and any potential positive effect 
on its legitimacy.  
van roozendaal investigates both the direct participation of non-state actors 
at the regional level, and their indirect participation via the national level. on the 
regional level, despite caricom’s commitment to strengthen the involvement of non-
state actors, this involvement has remained limited.  on the national level, only 
one member state was investigated, Barbados, being the country with the most 
developed social system of the caribbean. Barbados’s relatively advanced domestic 
system does not, however, seem to play an important role concerning caricom’s 
policies. van roozendaal’s main conclusion is therefore that caricom has failed to 
integrate non-state actors. she formulates four reasons for this failure: the lack of 
funds and capacity on the part of the rio, the lack of political will and the strong 
emphasis on sovereignty on the part of most governments, and finally, the lack of 
public understanding on the part of the population about caricom.  
The fifth question: links between regional and domestic democracy
Finally, the fifth question, about the role of RIOs in strengthening democracy in their 
member states, was addressed by the chapters 9 and 10. in addition, the link between 
domestic and regional democracy was dealt with in the last section of chapter 3. 
in the latter, erthal explores the relationship between regional democracy and 
the national democracies of member states. she bases her argument on the study 
conducted by steven fish, who concluded that the presence of strong national 
legislatives correlates to a strong level of democracy. following fish’s argument, 
erthal investigates whether there is any correlation between the level of democracy 
of member states and the strength of regional legislatives. Using the freedom house 
democracy index to assess the level of democracy in the member states of seven 
rios (the same rios discussed in this volume: the andean community, asean, 
SICA, Caricom, the EU, Mercosur and the SADC), Erthal finds a positive correlation 
between domestic democracy and regional democracy. 
these conclusions reinforce the observations made by Malamud and de sousa 
in Chapter 5, that domestic institutions constitute an important factor influencing 
the strength and legitimacy of regional (parliamentary) institutions. while erthal 
assessed the relationship between formal democratic institutions at the national and 
regional levels, Malamud and de sousa explored more extensively the role which 
regional parliamentary institutions can play in strengthening domestic democracies 
and vice versa. 
in chapter 9, anna van der vleuten calls attention to the point that having 
instruments to intervene in the case of threats or ruptures of democracy does not 
imply that a rio will necessarily act when facing a crisis. she investigated why 
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asean and sadc sometimes intervened to ‘preserve or promote democracy’, and 
sometimes not. she argues, based on these cases, that rios intervene in cases where 
intervention serves the geopolitical, domestic political or material interests of the 
regional major power, or where external pressure raises the ideological or economic 
costs of non-intervention. 
in chapter 10, andrea ribeiro hoffmann focused on the process of 
institutionalization of political conditionality within rios, and one particular 
mechanism by which rios can intervene in their member states when they face 
a rupture of democracy, or the threat of one: the so-called democratic clauses. 
she found that in the case of the eU, the process of enlargement and the crisis in 
austria played a major role explaining the creation of the mechanism. in the case 
of Mercosur, the crises in paraguay were the main driving force behind it. next, 
ribeiro hoffmann explored the impact of the use of the democratic clause upon the 
quality of democracy in austria and paraguay. she concludes that its impact was 
very limited. 
chapters 9 and 10 offer complementary analyses, exploring the potential of rios 
to contribute to the realization of basic values like democracy and rule of law in their 
member states, and which can be attributed, therefore, to output legitimacy. the 
main conclusion is that rios cannot be taken for granted as positive instruments 
for ensuring and promoting democracy in member states. despite their potential 
contribution, rios will not always intervene when needed, and when they do, their 
intervention may rather strengthen any status quo regime regardless of its democratic 
credentials and their impact on national regimes may be limited. 
Conclusion: the Gap
this volume deals with different aspects of the legitimacy/democracy issue in regional 
governance and offers qualitative analyses of different rios in different regions of 
the world. table 11.1 gives an overview of the chapters and their substantive and 
geographical focus. although the book has not presented qualitative analyses for 
all aspects of all rios, when read in combination, the chapters enable the reader to 
grasp the meaning and interconnectedness of the aspects studied.
in fact, one aspect of the concept of legitimacy that we emphasize in this book 
is precisely the interconnectedness of input, control and output legitimacy among 
rios. we argue that these three aspects are intrinsically linked. for that reason, any 
conception of the legitimacy of rios which is based exclusively on only one aspect 
of legitimacy, such as output legitimacy, will be limited and probably biased. By 
acknowledging the interconnectedness of the three aspects, it is possible to see how 
important it is to analyze, on the one hand, the role of parliamentary bodies and sub-
national state actors, and, on the other hand, the role of non-state actors in the process 
of policy-making of rios. we do not think there is a single ‘formula’ indicating how 
much of each of these aspects is needed in order to ‘classify’ a RIO as sufficiently 
legitimate. such an assessment needs to be made on a case-by-case basis. 
in addition, to say that we can compare rios is not to say that the same formula 
is valid for all of them. different constituencies will accord different levels of 
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legitimacy to the rios they take part in according to the kind of political culture 
they are embedded in. this political culture, in turn, will have developed within the 
framework of nation states – some over the past 500 years, in the case of several 
european states, others for a much shorter period, such as most african and southeast 
asian states which were decolonized only last century. for this reason, an important 
aspect of the legitimacy of rios is their role in strengthening the democratic values 
of its member states. 
we have explored the question of whether rios widen or close the gap which 
has opened between citizens and policy makers, as a result of the processes of 
globalization and regionalization. there is no easy, general answer to the question, 
but our most important finding is that it is the domestic level which is crucial in 
this respect, not the regional level in itself. the quality of regional parliamentary 
arrangements reflects the quality of domestic democracy. State sovereignty and the 
concentration of power in the hands of central governments at the national level are 
major obstacles to the participation of subnational state actors and non-state actors. 
participation by non-state actors at the regional level is connected to the development 
of civil society in rios member states. the effectiveness of democratic clauses and 
regional interventions is closely related to the strength of democratic institutions and 
democratic identity at the domestic level. from this, it follows that the shift from 
national to regional governance is likely to widen the legitimacy gap in those rios 
where domestic democracy is relatively weak already.     
here it becomes clear how limited it is to consider only the economic output of 
rios as a legitimizing argument. how can we say a rio is legitimate because of its 
economic benefits, if it widens the gap between policy makers and their constituents 
or has a negative effect on the level or quality of democracy among its member 
states? in our view, all these aspects must be taken into consideration if we want 
to make a serious assessment of the relationship between rios, legitimacy and 
democracy. we believe that the conceptual and empirical analysis developed in this 
book has made a contribution in that regard.
